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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses the behaviour of Albanian apple growers and their relations with buye rs based on a structured 
survey. We develop a model of relational governance that highlights  the importance of sustainable (lasting) 
relationships and draws upon different theoretical frameworks such as transaction cost economics and social 
network theory and focuses on determinants of relational exchange. The findings support the social network 
argument that the presence of verbal agreements between business partners strongly and positively affects 
exchange relationships. Asset specificity and competition among buyers also affects such relationships. The results 
and their implications at the management and policy-making level are discussed in detail 
Keywords. relational governance, verbal contracting, channel choice.  
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1 Introduction  
Fruit production is one of the most important and fastest growing agriculture subsectors in Albania. The 
production of fresh fruit has grown by 38% since 2007 reaching 394,960 tonnes in 2013 (FAO, 2013). The 
orchard sector has also been considered a priority sector by the Albanian government (MAFCP, 2007; 
MARDWA, 2014).  
In terms of cultivated area, apples are the most important fruit, followed by figs and grapes, respectively. 
On the demand side, household expenditures on apples are the second highest for all fruit s and 
vegetables combined, after tomatoes (USAID’s AAC, 2008). Some of the reasons for the importance and 
widespread production of apples are their easy long-term storage, the possibility of cultivation in different 
climate conditions and a long local tradition in terms of both production and consumption.  
Apple production has increased more than five times in the period between 2000 and 2013 (Table 1). 
Moreover, apple production is expected to further increase in the coming years, because of the creation 
of new plantations stimulated by government subsidy schemes. These schemes have been introduced by 
the Ministry of Agriculture
*
 due to a high domestic consumer demand. 
                                                 
*
Until 2013 the full name of the Ministry of Agriculture was the ‘Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Consumer 
Protection (MAFCP)’. Thereafter the name was changed to the ‘Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Development and 
Water Administration (MARDWA)’.  
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Table 1. 
Dynamics of production and gross supply of apples 
Category 
 
2000 2007 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Production Mt 12,000 36,000 54,604 56,000 71,300 62,065 
Import Mt 28,163 22,516 17,702 11,399 11,469 8,853 
Export Mt 0 147 1,097 2,323 4,309 2,569 
Supply Mt 40,163 58,369 71,209 66,399 78,460 68,349 
Export/import % 0.00% 0.70% 6.20% 20.30% 37.57% 29.02% 
Production/supply % 29.90% 61.50% 76.70% 84.30% 90.87% 90.81% 
Import/supply % 70.10% 38.60% 24.90% 17.10% 14.62% 12.95% 
         Source: FAO (production), UNSTAT (import – export) 
 
Such dynamic developments in the sector have had an impact on the supply chain as a whole, its actors’ 
behaviour and the relationships between them. The objective of this research is to analyse the 
determinants of exchange (trade) relationships between orchard farmers and their buyers, using 
transaction cost economics (TCE) and network theory (NT) perspectives.  
This paper aims to provide both practical and theoretical contributions. In practical terms, insight into 
determinants of vertical coordination in the fruit value chain represents useful information for pu blic 
policy makers and the most feasible option in support of vertical relationships; this is critical for a sector 
in expansion beyond the domestic market. The research seeks to provide a modest contribution to the 
scientific literature by ‘testing the limits’ of TCE and NT in a post-communist transition country with weak 
law enforcement institutions.  
The paper is organised in six sections. Section 2 consists of a review of the theoretical background 
focusing on transaction cost economics and network theory arguments followed, in section 3, by a general 
description of the business relationships between farmers and different categories of buyers, depending 
on the marketing channel used by famers. Based on theoretical considerations and the overview of 
exchange relationships presented in section 3, Section 4 analyses the method used and the empirical 
model proposed by the authors. Section 5 reflects on the empirical research findings, whilst section 6 
provides the discussion, conclusions, further research recommendations and limitations of the study. 
2 Theoretical background  
2.1 Transaction cost economics 
Transaction cost analysis (TCA) is one of the most frequent theoretical frameworks applied in research on 
business relationships (Heide, 1994). Transaction cost economics (TCE) focuses on opportunistic 
behaviour as a constant in transactions between buyers and suppliers, and its variation can be explained 
by the characteristics of transactions (1) the level of uncertainty, (2) the likelihood of recurrence, an d (3) 
the degree of asset specificity (Williamson, 1979). Within the framework of TCE, supplier -buyer 
relationships should be structured in such a way as to minimize transaction costs (Williamson, 1975, 
1993a, b).The structure of governance ranges from (spot) market relationships to vertical integration or 
hierarchy with hybrid governance forms (contracts) in between (Williamson, 1979, 1999).  
The trend in governance has, in recent years, been moving toward the adoption of bilateral tools of 
governance (Heide, 1994). This bilateral approach to governance has been described as networks (Powell, 
1990), strategic alliances (Achrol, 1991), hybrids (Williamson 1991), and relational exchange (Dwyer, et al., 
1987), cooperatives (Ménard, 2007), and vertical coordination (Stern and Reve, 1980). Alternative means 
of ensuring and empowering hybrid transactions include trust, reputation, and financial hostage (Klein, 
1980; Dyer, 1996). Hybrid or intermediate forms of governance are seen as a valid alternative to hierarchy 
since both partners can limit opportunism by cooperating with each other. The advantages of cooperation 
exceed gains from market competition while autonomous units provide more flexibility (Ménard, 2012). 
Such a view is in line with the theoretical reasoning in network theory (e.g. Powell, 1990; Uzzi, 1996).  
2.2 Network theory  
Network theory applies a wider perspective to the study of relationships compared to the dyadic 
approach of TCE since it takes into account the social context in which firms opera te. Conceptually, a 
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network consists of a large number of actors and the nature of relationships that tie them together 
(Iacobucci and Hopkins, 1992), including both horizontal and vertical relationships. Networks can be 
considered as an independent coalition of economic entities that operate without hierarchical control 
embedded in a shared value system that define membership roles and responsibilities  (Achrol and Kotler, 
1999). Sociologists like Granovetter (1985) suggest that the network perspective should be carefully 
considered since social structure has an impact on the economic activity of firms and the outcome of 
transactions. This conception of networks has an impact on governance mechanisms and the instruments 
applied to enforce them. Investigating such mechanisms sheds light into the different relationships 
between buyers and suppliers embedded in social networks.  
2.3 Social networks, contractual governance and alternatives  
By embedding itself in networks, a firm creates new opportunities for intermediate forms of governance. 
The rather simplistic choice between contract bidding and administrative fiat appears unsuitable when 
alternative and ‘cheaper’ governance mechanisms can be adopted. Contractual governance, as 
agreements reached by parties to reduce risk and uncertainty in exchange relationships (Hughes, 1994), 
could constitute a useful instrument for regulating such relationships, among others. .  
The formal contract represents pledges and promises to perform specific actions in the future (Macneil, 
1978), hence protecting firms from opportunistic behaviour of their partners (Williamson, 1975). 
Contracts also serve as a coordinating instrument, clarifying mutual expectations and establishing a basis 
for shared common ground by defining rules, roles and responsibilities (Das and Teng, 2004). Empirical 
studies support the arguments that standardized contracting is an instrument the purpose of which is to 
overcome the problems of uncertainty (Poole et al, 1998).  
In the agriculture sector, contract farming is a significant institutional arrangement that facilitates market 
access for smallholders, especially when the transaction costs of direct market participation are high for 
producers and/or traders (Costales and Catelo, 2008). The evidence also suggests that larger farms prefer 
formal contracts, whereas informal contracts are more accommodating to the need s of smallholders 
(Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Grimard, 1997). However, formal contractual relationships are less frequent 
when there is little trust in legal enforcement (Bakucs et al., 2010). In the case of weak law enforcement 
institutional framework, farmers often prefer informal and self-enforcing arrangements (Jabbar et al., 
2008; Bouis and Haddad, 1990). Furthermore, small farms rely more on reputation mechanisms and on 
network contacts to support such mechanisms instead of detailed (formal) contracting (Nooteboom, 
1999). On the other hand, theorist like Williamson (1985) argue that as exchange hazards rise so must 
contractual safeguards turning contracts into a rather difficult and expensive device. Additionally, 
contracting is just one of the devices to structured hybrid governance (Ménard, 2012). Trust, reputation 
and verbal agreements constitute valuable mechanisms when legal enforcement is missing and relational 
ties emerge such as in the case of the Albanian apple sector.  
2.4 Relational governance – converging network and transaction cost arguments and defining  
 determinants  
The network, in which exchange relationships occur, can have a strong influence on business partners’  
behaviour and the outcome of the exchange itself. Repeated exchanges in embedded relationships 
protect against transaction hazards by encouraging cooperative behaviour that enables the selection of 
trustworthy (trade) partners (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). These forms of cooperative, relational exchange 
are based on a social component, largely represented by trust  (Macneil, 1978). Trust characterises 
relational ties that constitute an essential ingredient in many business relationships. Additionally, the 
nature of networks in which Albanian apple farmers operate is characteri sed by a great number of ties 
between farmers and local collectors, granting farmers access to a significant amount of information. In 
high density networks, information and resources spread quickly and efficiently because of the many 
interconnections between network members (Coleman, 1990). In relational -governed exchanges involving 
access to information, reputation and trust between partners, informal  agreements limit opportunism and 
enable the enforcement of obligations and promises. 
The sociological and network literature focuses more on long socialization processes as a factor leading to 
durable, lasting and sustainable business relationships, with little attention being paid to other 
determinants such as specific assets, level of uncertainty and competition in shaping such relationships. 
Investing in specific assets can be viewed as a “credible commitment”  to the relationship (Williamson 
1983, 1985). Bilateral relations can be crafted by means of a reciprocal “hostage exchange,” in which two 
parties make “separate but concurrent investments in specific assets” (Williamson 1983, p. 532). Such 
strategies can help to create a self-enforced agreement between the parties involved in a transaction. 
Furthermore, perceptions of high levels of environmental uncertainty may negatively affect the 
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willingness of exchange partners to invest in the long term sustainability of the relationship (Joshi and 
Campbell, 2003). Moreover, competition can affect the willingness of both buyers and suppliers to 
commit themselves to durable exchange relationships, depending on the level of uncertainty (Walker and 
Weber, 1987). It appears that a combination of TCE and network arguments in investigating embedded 
business relationships provides a deeper understanding of relationship dynamics.  
Based on the theoretical background discussed above, we analyse the influence of various aspects of the 
TCE framework such as specific assets uncertainty and determinants derived from both TCE and network 
theory, including verbal contracting and competition between buyers in sustained business relationships. 
Our analysis considers other factors such as marketing channels used by farmers, focusing on their 
participation in sustainable embedded transactions, helping to better define the dynamics of the various 
modes of governance in the apple sector.  
3 Market channels and business relationships  
Farmer – local collector channel 
Local collectors are important actors in the fruit value chain. The significant increase in domestic 
production has certainly encouraged local apple wholesalers, and especially larger farmers (who often act 
as traders), to invest in cold storage warehouses. Although their principal market function is to serve as 
collectors by aggregating and selling produce, their role is becoming increasingly important in 
coordinating the chain upstream, given that farmers tend to relate to local actors who they know (and 
trust).  
Farmer – wholesaler channel  
The role of the (larger) wholesalers as “chain captains”, at least in this sub-sector, is diminishing due to 
the increased power of local collectors. However, they continue to exercise a degree of control in their 
outlet channels due to experience and long-standing collaboration 3.3 with many retailers.  
Farmer – exporter channel 
The function of the exporter is usually carried out by importers, or by one of the above categories of 
players, and often on sporadic basis. It may also be assumed by traders from the region who come and 
import directly from Albania. The standards required by export markets constitute a major challenge for 
farmers. The wholesalers and local collectors that are striving to “upgrade” to export market 
requirements increasingly seek to coordinate their efforts with selected farmers to meet such 
requirements. This is becoming an imperative for such actors due to the saturation of the domestic 
market.  
Farmer – processor channel 
There are no reported data on the number of processors, and related quantities of apples processed. 
According to the authors’ observations in the market, however, apple processing is a minor activity for 
only a few processors (just two relevant cases have been identified). According to Imami et al (2013), only 
a small share of apples is sold to processors (ca 5%), and an even smaller share is processed on farms (less 
than 1%). Therefore, at present, processors do not represent an important channel of sales for apple 
farmers.  
Farmer – retailer channel  
Supermarket chains were introduced only recently in Albania (in mid 2000). At present, supermarket 
chains play a minor role in fruit sales – only 5% of consumers in Tirana (the largest city in Albania) mainly 
buy apples at supermarkets (Imami et al, 2012). This figure is  lower in smaller towns, where supermarket 
chains are not yet the norm. Supermarket chains are typically supplied by wholesalers. At the retail level, 
most fruit and vegetables are sold in (specialised) green markets (GTZ, 2010). In fact, most consumers 
(56%) in Tirana buy apples in such green markets (Imami et al, 2012). Greenmarket retailers are typically 
supplied by wholesalers, but there are also cases of direct supply from farmers, while farmers often sell 
their produce directly to consumers in the greenmarket. Furthermore, there are convenience shops in 
every neighbourhood and close to every large residential building that sell fresh fruit and vegetables. To 
conclude, most small retailers are supplied on the wholesale market, buying mainly from wholesalers and 
eventually also from farmers (Imami, 2011). 
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4 Research hypothesis, methods and materials  
Research model and hypotheses 
Determinants from the transaction cost perspective 
We consider two key determinants of transaction costs in this section – the degree of asset specificity and 
perceived uncertainty related to price and product specifications.  
Asset specificity 
Asset specificity refers to durable and specialised investments that are undertaken in support of particular 
transactions that have limited value for alternative uses. The presence of specific assets constitutes an 
important factor for a buyer or supplier in pursuing a higher degree of coordination as a safeguard from 
asset expropriation (Williamson, 1985).The problem of safeguarding specific assets could be a serious one 
for many Albanian farmers, especially in those areas with few potential buyers. If farmers lack an 
alternative market for their produce, hold-up by the local consolidator poses a considerable threat 
although not as considerable as in the case of perishable products such as milk or some fruits (e.g. 
cherries), etc. We focus on the risk of farmers’ exposure to eventual opportunistic behaviour, arguing that 
higher levels of asset specificity increase requirements for a coordinated form of governance. Thus, we 
expect a positive effect of asset specificity on sustainable (lasting) exchange relationships:  
H1. Investments in specific assets are expected to be positively associated with the likelihood for farmer s 
to establish sustainable (lasting) relationships with their buyers.  
Uncertainty can be related to the inability to predict partner behaviour or changes in the external 
environment. Behavioural uncertainty, in particular, creates the problem of performance evaluation, 
leading to an increase in transaction costs and renegotiation of contract terms (Rindfleish and Heide, 
1997). Organisations’ efforts to minimize transaction costs arising from uncertainty may lead to the 
development of internal governance structures (Williamson, 1985, John and Weitz, 1988) or vertical 
coordination under low levels of asset specificity (Buvik and Gronhaug, 2000).  
In agriculture sectors, and in particular the apple sector, performance evaluation is problematic since the 
quality attributes of products are subjective, hence giving rise to uncertainties among buyers and farmers. 
Higher levels of uncertainty are expected to increase coordination between business partners. We test 
this assertion through the following hypothesis:  
H2. Increased uncertainty increases the likelihood for farmers to establish sustainable (lasting) 
relationships with buyers.  
Determinants from the network theory perspective 
Based on such a conceptual outlook of networks, and evaluating carefully the research settings, we 
consider two key determinants of networks: (a) verbal contracts as an expression of responsibility, 
mutability, trust and coordination complementing relational governance and (b) competition between 
buyers. 
Verbal contracts – expression of embedded transactions  
In the Albanian apple sector the fragmentation of production, high costs of formal contracts and the 
difficulty in measuring performance are some of the reasons why farmers and local collectors use informal 
contracts as instruments to govern their relationships. In such conditions, formal contracts are not 
deemed to be the most feasible device to control and coordinate exchange relationships. Hence, a 
legitimate question may be the following:  what is an appropriate substitute to formal contracts for the 
safeguarding of transaction? If verbal contracts are the answer - what is the nature of such mechanisms?  
Relational governed exchange, as an alternative to contract governance,  can mitigate hazards associated 
with performance measurement and uncertainty. Relational governance can reduce environmental 
uncertainty and lower adaption costs in buyer-supplier relationships (Noordewier et al., 1990). 
Furthermore, as empirical evidence suggests, relational ties based on trust can have an impact on contract 
enforcement (whether verbal or written contracts) hence reducing behaviour uncertainty. Examining the 
apple sector in Shandong province (China), Cai and Ma (2015) found that contract enforcement choice is 
significantly influenced by transaction costs, as well as by farmers’ cognition trust to the exchange 
partners. Empirical research in the Albanian medicinal aromatic sector concluded that increased trust and 
lower behaviour uncertainty have a positive effect on the enforcement of verbal agreements and leads to 
sustainable (lasting) exchange relationships (Gerdoçi, 2014). We argue that verbal agreements represent 
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not only the mechanisms that strengthen relational ties but also constitute the proof of the existence of 
such relations.  
The presence of verbal contracts is also an indication of coordination between exchanging partners. 
Empirical research confirms the link between sustainable exchange relationships and the coordinating 
aspects embodied in verbal contracts. Focusing on buyers, Ali and Kumar (2015) investigated verbal 
contracts between farmers and contractors, comparing risky pre-flowering mango contracts with more 
beneficial post-flowering ones. The author found that management-related contract characteristics such 
as contract enforcement mechanisms, contracting pricing and duration are less likely to affect the 
decision of contractors to enter into post-flowering contracts. The results indicate that contractors who 
place comparatively less importance on management related characteristics (forms of coordination), are 
more likely to enter into post-flowering contracting. Underlying the role of effective communication and 
personal bonds between buyers and suppliers, Reynolds et al., (2009) found that these factors are key 
determinants of sustainable business relationships.  
Hence, we argue that verbal contracts represent not only an expression of trust and personal bonds but 
also mutual commitment and in many cases coordination between business partners. Thus, we expect 
informal contracts to have a positive effect on sustainable relationships between farmers and their 
buyers:  
H3. Presence of verbal contracts as forms of agreements/coordination increases the likelihood of farmers 
establishing sustainable (lasting) relationships with buyers.  
Based on TCT, the external environment is usually encapsulated within measures of competitiveness 
based, on the assumption that the lower the competition the more likely a firm will be exposed to “small 
numbers bargaining” (Williamson, 1985). There is a clear relation between competition and environment 
uncertainty. As uncertainty regarding a buyer's future requirements increases, as well as corresponding 
potential adjustment costs for suppliers, buyers are more inclined to adapt hierarchical forms of 
governance to mitigate hazards of opportunistic behaviour (Williamson, 1975). Based on this assumption, 
we expect that the greater the competition between buyers, the more likely farmers are willing to behave 
opportunistically. We test this assertion through the following hypothesis: 
H4 Increased competition between buyers is negatively associated with likelihood for farmers to establish 
sustainable (lasting) relationships with buyers.  
Figure 1 provides a schema of the research model of sustainable relationships (observed through 
repeated exchanges) and their determinants.  
Aset specificitys t s ifi it
Contracts/
agreements
tr ts/
r ts
Competition 
between supliers
titi  
t  s li rs
Repeated exchanget  
Transaction cost perspective
Network perspective
Sustainable 
Relationships
H1 (+)
H2  (+)
H3  (+)
H4  (-)
Uncertaintyrt i t
 
Figure 1. Research model of transaction costs and network determinants of sustainable relationships 
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Data 
This paper is based on a survey of orchard farmers specialised in apple production and in-depth 
exploratory interviews with farmers and their buyers. The survey was conducted by way of a structured 
questionnaire that was designed based on an extensive literature review, in-depth interviews with 
network actors and consultations with agricultural economists, scholars and practitioners. The 
questionnaire was initially tested on selected farmers and further improved after testing. The survey 
instrument collects basic information about farm structure and production , farm household 
demographics, relations with buyers as well as farmer perceptions regarding the enabling environment 
and other related information needed to test the study hypothesis . 
The data were collected by interviewing 182 orchard farmers in the main apple production areas in 
Albania (namely, Korce and Diber); the sample size lead to a margin of error of 7% (Israel, 1992). Due to 
the lack of an apple farmer list/database, a haphazard selection of farmers was used - farmers were 
approached randomly in the villages, neighbourhoods, streets, etc. Almost all of the farmers that were 
approached participated in the survey. The structured survey was carried out during April-May 2013 in the 
largest orchard (apple) producing regions in Albania, namely Korçë (situated in the South) and Peshkopi 
(situated in the North). Most interviews were carried out in Korça (Table 2) since it counts for more than 
half of the country’s apple production (GTZ, 2010). One hundred and eighty (180) questionnaires were 
subject to further analyses (2 were disregarded due to missing data).  
Furthermore, 7 in-depth (with open-ended questions) interviews with agronomists, wholesalers, local 
collectors and farmers were also conducted by the authors of this paper to increase their understanding 
of the governance dynamics in this sector, which depends on the marketing channel selected by farmers. 
This provided additional inputs for the design of the structured questionnaire too.  
About two-thirds of the interviewed farmers have orchards that are larger than 0.5 ha. In terms of 
representativeness, it is estimated that the study sample covers a considerable share of the larger farm 
segments. The sample includes a few small farms (up to 0.2 ha, according to our classification) (Table 2).  
Table 2. 
Distribution of the farm population and sample according to orchard size 
Ha 
Population Sample Sample/ 
population Freq. Share Freq. Share 
0 – 0.2 43,086 70.6% 10 5.5% 0.0% 
> 0.2 – 0.3 6,034 9.9% 21 11.5% 0.3% 
> 0.3 – 0.4 4,766 7.8% 12 6.6% 0.3% 
> 0.4 – 0.5 3,115 5.1% 20 11.0% 0.6% 
> 0.5 – 0.75 2,243 3.7% 27 14.8% 1.2% 
> 0.75 – 1 1,321 2.2% 38 20.9% 3.0% 
> 1 – 1.5 449 0.7% 37 20.3% 8.2% 
> 1.5 – 3 36 0.1% 17 9.3% 47.2% 
Total 61,050 100% 182 100.0% 0.3% 
Source: Field survey (for the sample), Ministry of Agriculture Food and Consumer Protection (MAFCP), Statistical Sector, 
upon request (national population). 
 
The questionnaire was designed to operationalize the constructs discussed in the Research Model and 
Hypothesis section and summarized in Table 3. The following information was collected: relationships 
between suppliers and buyers (sale to the same or different buyer), reasons for selling to the same buyer 
(secure market, trust, fair prices, closer economic and financial relationships, inertia, shorter distance, 
agreement, quick and secure payment), price and product characteristic uncertainty, contracting and 
reasons for the lack of formal contracts, asset specificity (farming experience, cultivated area, production 
and income, assets and investments), level of cooperative action, competition among farmers, and 
competition among buyers. Other relevant information was also included in the questionnaire such as : 
demographics (age, education, gender, household size, and main employment), marketing c hannel chosen 
by farmers, time and form of payment, transport time and costs, information and negotiation costs.   
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Measurements 
Details of the constructs and the operationalization of variables are provided in Table 3 and are discussed 
below. 
Sustainable relationship 
Following Klein(1996), and consistent with the conceptualization of relational ties as the means of 
determining a supplier’s dedication to its buyer, we measure this construct in terms of repeated 
exchanges with one or more selected buyers. This is also consistent with the empirical research of John 
and Weitz (1988) and Zaheer and Venkatraman (1995) who used similar measures. We use a dummy 
variable to measure repeated exchanges. The variable takes the value 1 for “sell to the same buyer/s” and  
0 for “sell to different buyers”.  
Specific assets   
Although the concept of specific assets is clear, the operationalization of specific assets , especially in the 
farming sector, could end up being more complicated. Fertő and Szabó (2002), in their investigation of the 
vegetable sector, examine the effect of specific assets on the type of selling channel chosen by farmers. 
They operationalized specific assets as investments made, intention to invest and human specific assets 
by using age and level of education as proxies. On the other hand, resource-based theory (RBT) sustains 
that advantages from asset ownership can endure for certain periods of time and can also arise from 
owning assets that are valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable (Barney, 1991). Based on this 
theoretical conceptualization, and following the empirical research of Fertő and Szabó (2002), we focus on 
specific assets, respectively as the contribution of apple cultivation to the family income and experience in 
farming. We argue that the more farmers are dependent on their income from this activity, the more t hey 
consider cultivated surfaces as specific valuable assets that are the sole means of ensuring their 
livelihoods. The contribution of the main activity to the family income is measured by 
Contribution_income, a variable measuring the percentage of income from apple cultivation to the total 
income. Meanwhile, experience in farming can be associated with other characteristics of specific assets, 
i.e. rarity and inimitability. Experience in farming is measured by Experience_farm, a single scale variable 
indicator measuring years of experience. The significant standard deviation (6.567 years) compared to the 
mean (12.16 years) provides some significant evidence of potential differences between farmers, in terms 
of know-how and experience accumulated, strengthening the possibility of an eventual effect on the 
nature of the relationship with their buyers.  
Uncertainty  
As discussed, we believe that high levels of uncertainty will prevent the channel member’s commitment to 
a sustainable relationship. By investigating the relationship between farmers and their buyers we identify 
behaviour uncertainty as the main cause of overall uncertainty. Following Zaheer and Venkatraman ’s 
(1995) conceptualization, we operationalize behavioural uncertainty with two indicators related to 
uncertainty regarding pricing and product specifications. Considering pricing as an indicator that can be 
influenced by other factors, it can be argued that it can partly measure the environment uncertainty. But, 
taking into account the dense networks in this sector, and the overall availability of information, we can 
argue that eventual opportunistic buyer behaviour can be mostly associated with uncertainty regarding 
price. This assumption is validated by the very good result of the reliability test,  Cronbach Alpha at 0.897.  
Competition between buyers   
The perception of competition between buyers is measured by a single scale variable indicator - 
Competition_buyers, taking values 1 “very low” to 5 “very high”.  
Size a control variable 
Empirical research on governance using the transaction cost approach has often included size as a control 
variable (e.g., Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995), since large suppliers are more reluctant to be “locked” 
into exchange relationships with one buyer. However, we do not hypothesise a direction for this variable 
in our model, but rather include it as a control variable. 
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Table 3. 
Details of constructs and measures 
Construct and Concept  Operationalization  Number of items Measurement 
Dependent variable  
Sustainable relationship 
 
Repeated exchange  1 Dummy, 1= sell to the same 
buyer/buyers , 0= spot 
market exchange 
Independent variable 
Specific assets 
 
1. Contribution to main 
income 
2. Experience in farming 
2 separate 
indicators 
Scale, percentage of income 
and number of years 
 
Verbal contract  
 
Presence of verbal 
contracting related to 
price and product 
specifications  
1 Dummy, 1= verbal contract, 
0 = no contract 
Uncertainty Uncertainty  related to:  
1. Price 
2. Product specifications 
2 Ordinal scale (low-high, 3-
points scale)  
Competition between 
buyers  
Perception of competition 
between buyers 
1 Ordinal scale (low-high, 5-
points scale)  
Control variables  
Size  Produced quantity as a 
proxy for size 
1 Apple production 
(kg/year/farm) 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
 
Empirical model 
A binary logistic regression model is used to estimate the farmers’ likelihood to engage in exchange 
relationships that are consistent with relational governance. This model was selected considering the 
dichotomous nature of the dependent variable (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989).   
This model has the following form: 
exba
P
P
Ln ii
i
i 

)
1
(  (1)  
Where Pi,is the probability that supplier i is engaged in exchange relationships that can be considered as 
sustainable; 1-Pi, the probability that the supplier i engages in spot market exchanges; a, a constant; xi the 
variables standing for independent variables, specific assets, verbal contracts, competition between 
buyers, and uncertainty; and bi vectors of parameters to be estimated.  
The odds ratio will be given by the equation below: 
iixbae
P
P 
1
 (2) 
The odds ratio for the case at hand should be interpreted as follows: a one unit change in the asset 
specificity increases the ratio of probability that a supplier engages in exchange relationships that can be 
defined as sustainable by e
b1 
to probability that farmers engage in spot market exchanges. 
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5 RESULTS 
5.1 Descriptive statistics results 
Apple production represents an important economic activity for the area investigated. More than half of 
family income (58.7%) is from apple production (Table 4); it ranges, however, from a minimum of 5% to 
99%, in exceptional cases, representing almost full specialisation,. The first quartile is 40%, meaning that 
for the lowest 25% “ladder”, the contribution of apple production to family income is less than 40%. The 
third quartile, for its part, is 80% meaning that for the highest 25% “ladder”, apple contribution to family 
income is greater than 80%.  
Table 4. 
Contribution of apple production to family income 
Mean Minimum Maximum Percentile 25 Median Percentile 75 
58.7 5.0 99.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 
Source: Field survey 
Apple farmers in Albania tend to sell to the same buyers; more than half of farmers included in the survey 
(50.5%) state that they sell mainly to the same buyer (Table 5).  
Table 5. 
Farmers’ stability in sale relationships 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Sales to the same buyer 92 50.8 50.8 50.8 
Sales to different buyer 89 49.2 49.2 100.0 
Total 181 100.0 100.0  
Source: Field survey 
Farmers mainly sell to local collectors – an important value chain actor represented mainly by large 
farmers who have invested in cold storage infrastructure. Slightly less than half of interviewed farmers 
(48.4%) sell their fresh produce to local collectors, and more than one-third of them (34.6%) sell to more 
distant wholesalers who, in previous years, were the main actors. 
Farmers have more stable relationships with local collectors, underscoring the role played by social ties in 
building sustainable exchange relations. This fact is confirmed by the stated reasons for selling to the 
same buyer (in order of importance), namely: (1) the buyer represents a secure market, (2) personal trust, 
(3) the buyer ensures secure and quick payment, and (4) fairer product prices. Furt hermore, local 
collectors engage in field observations as a method of ensuring quality control, hence suggesting a higher 
level of coordination.  
As expected, formal (written) contracts are not common. However, informal agreements exist – about 
20% of the farmers interviewed apply largely informal agreements (Table 6).  
Table 6. 
Contracting relations by type of clients 
Category 
Contracting/agreement 
Total No answer Written Unwritten No contract 
Wholesalers 
 
Count 0 0 11 52 63 
% 0% 0% 17% 83% 100% 
Local 
Collectors 
Count 0 0 23 65 88 
% 0% 0% 26% 74% 100% 
Other 
 
Count 1 1 2 26 30 
% 3% 3% 7% 87% 100% 
Total 
 
Count 1 1 36 143 181 
% 1% 1% 20% 79% 100% 
Source: Field survey 
Investments in cold storage infrastructure motivated by sector profitability , and also recent public 
support, have contributed to the development of downstream businesses. These businesses now face 
rather tough competition. More than two-thirds of farmers (66.9%) (Table 7) perceive “average 
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competition” to “very strong competition” among downstream actors. 
Table 7. 
Competition among downstream actors 
 
Frequency Percent 
No competition at all 10 5.5 
Weak competition 50 27.6 
Average competition 64 35.4 
Strong competition 45 24.9 
Very strong competition 12 6.6 
Total 181 100.0 
   Source: Field survey 
5.2 Empirical model results 
Although the descriptive analysis provides some good hints in identifying determinants of sustainable 
relationships, the model analysis and in-depth interviews provide a deeper understanding. Table 8 
summarizes the results of the logistic regression for the significant relations between independent and 
dependent variables only. The Hosmer and Lemeshow test shows p>0.05, ensuring the validity of the 
model (0,526). Around one-third of the variance can be attributed to the independent variables 
(Nagelkerke R Square is 0,316). Classification tables show that the model predicts 70.6% of cases , against 
51.1% for the initial classification table. By analysing production size as a control variable, as well as the 
rest of the predictors (by including them in the analysis in separate blocks), we conclude that there is no 
significant variability in the relationship between predictors and depending variable s due to the effect of 
the control variable. This effect is statistically insignificant. While this variable is significant when its 
relationship with the sustainable relationship is tested in the first block (Exp (B) =1,003), it proves to be 
insignificant when tested in the model in the second block. In depth interviews c onfirm divergent 
behaviour of farmers that produce large quantities of apples; some tend to be more opportunistic, 
exercising their bargaining power, whilst some others prefer to have a secure market. The following 
interpretation is based on the final results of our analysis:  
Hypothesis 1 is supported only for one of the variables measuring asset specificity. The contribution of 
income from apple production to the total income as a proxy of asset specificity is positively and 
significantly associated with sustainable relationships. The parameter Exp(B) for Contribution_income is 
1,017, hence statistically significant at p<0.05 (Table 8) and demonstrating that farmers that earn most of 
their income from apple cultivation are slightly more “keen” to engage in sustainable and long-term 
relationships (the standard deviation is significant at 28%, with a mean of 58.7% substantially increasing 
the odds). The likelihood of engaging in sustainable relationships versus spot market exchanges - the odds 
ratio (P/1-P)  - increases by 2.5 times
†
 when switching from apple contribution to the family income 
minimum value of 5% to an average value of 58.7% and by 4.9 times when switching from a minimum 
value to a maximum value of 99% (Table 4). It is therefore clear that although Exp(B) is small, given the 
farmers’ distribution in terms of apple contribution to family income, the effect of speciali sation is quite 
substantial. 
Table 8. 
Results of the logistic regression 
Variables in the Equation B S.E. Wald p-value Exp(B) 
Production size  ,001 ,001 ,619 ,431 1,001 
Contribution_income ,017 ,007 6,219 ,013* 1,017 
Experience_farm  -,006 ,027 ,047 ,828 ,994 
Uncertainty  -,340 ,268 1,611 ,204 ,712 
Contract_dummy 2,317 ,591 15,387 ,000** 10,149 
Competition_buyers  -,344 ,174 3,898 ,048* ,709 
Constant ,293 ,959 ,093 ,760 1,340 
**p<0, 01, *p<0, 05                                      Source:  Authors’ calculations 
                                                 
†Given Exp (B) of 1.017 and the difference between average and minimum apple contribution to family income 
of 53.7% (58.7% - 5%), the odds ratio increases by 2.4 times (1.017
53.7
). The same applies when switching from 
minimum to maximum apple contribution to family income 
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Meanwhile, the hypothesis positing a positive relationship between experience in farming and relational 
governance was not supported, as it is not statistically significant (Table 8).  
Hypothesis 2 is rejected. This hypothesis, positing a positive relationship between uncertainty and 
sustainable relationships, was not supported; it is not statistically significant (Table  8). 
Hypothesis 3 is supported. As hypothesised, the presence of verbal contracts as forms of 
agreements/cooperation is positively and significantly associated with sustainable relationships. The 
parameter Exp (B) is 10,149 and statistically significant at p<0.01 (Table 8), showing that farmers engaging 
in verbal contracts with buyers are 10 times more likely to engage in sustainable relationships with their 
buyer/s rather than spot market exchanges. Qualitative research confirms increased collaboration 
between farmers and local collectors, in particular when their relationships have matured to verbal or 
"gentlemen’s" agreements. Local collectors tend to be reliable markets for many farmers who, in some 
cases, tend to follow buyers’ instructions regarding plant nutrition, harvesting and post-harvesting 
procedures and farmers tend to prefer buyers with whom they have an verbal agreement . When farmers 
are offered higher prices by other buyers they tend to seek a solution with a preferred buyer before 
abandoning the preferred relationship (and usually find one).  
Hypothesis 4 is supported. Perceived high levels of competition are negatively and significantly associated 
with sustainable relationships. The parameter Exp (B) is 0,710, statistically significant at p<0.05 (Table 8), 
shows that farmers are less likely to engage in sustainable relationships with their buyer/s under 
conditions of high perceived competition between buyers. The likelihood of establishing sustainable 
relationships with buyers versus spot market sales, or odds ratio (P/1-P), twofold twice - from 0.71 to 0.36 
- for farmers perceiving very strong competition compared to farmers perceiving weak competition  
among buyers.  Such situation is confirmed by interviews with buyers who affirm that “a lot of bargaining” 
takes place with farmers during the “short period” of harvesting due to the presence of many potential 
buyers.  
6 Discussions and conclusions 
The study investigates the determinants of sustainable relationships  between farmers and their buyers in 
Albania – a post-communist transition country. The results validate some TCE propositions related to 
asset specificity and network theorists’ arguments sustaining that interactions embedded within close ties 
will yield sustainable relationships (e.g., Granovetter, 1985; Powell, 1990). 
Consistent with TCE, the research found that farmers’ propensity to cooperate with buyers is positively 
associated with investment in specific assets measured by a percentage of income used as a proxy for 
specific assets. The effect proves to be non-trivial (considering the significant standard deviation and its 
effect on the odds value), hence underscoring the relevance of farm specialisation and its impact on 
business relationships. It seems that specialised Albanian farmers tend to be more inclined to engage in 
sustainable relationships. This result has some interesting implications since the number of such farms in 
this sector is increasing steadily. Yet, our research does not provide sufficient insight into the effects of 
specialisation associated with large production capacity on exchange relationships. The evidence of 
increased bargaining power on the part of large farmers raises some questions related to the type of 
mechanisms, other than relational ties, used to safeguard specific assets from opportunistic behaviour. 
Some of the findings seem to be valid for other value chains in the Albanian context, as supported by 
Gerdoçi (2014) who argued that investment in specific assets by farmers operating in the medicinal and 
aromatic plant sector are positively associated with their willingness to cooperate with other downstream 
actors. 
Our results are less consistent with the TCE framework with regard to whether suppliers select relational 
exchanges in response to increased levels of uncertainty. Focusing on behaviour uncertainty, the present 
research operationalized uncertainty with two items that proved to be reliable in measuring the level of 
uncertainty, but failed to prove a significant relationship with sustainable relationships. This result 
contrasts with previous research (Gerdoçi, 2014) focussing on a different sector, which confirmed the role 
of uncertainty as a quasi-moderator for sustainable (lasting) relationships. Further research focused on a 
deeper disaggregation of the construct based on the sub-sector context, seeking to separate the effects of 
both environment and behaviour uncertainty, should be explored. Additionally, testing the hypothesis at a 
later date, considering uncertainty as a dynamic (changing with time) variable, could also prove insightful 
in understanding the relationship between uncertainty and sustainable (lasting) relationships, given that 
the Albanian fruit sector is prone to uncertainties related to domestic market saturation.  
Our empirical test confirms the network theorist argument that embeddedness is an important factor in 
explaining exchange relationships (Granovetter, 1985). The strong link between informal 
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contracts/agreements and sustainable relationships, and especially the role local consolidators, confirms 
that agreements based on trust, mutuality and discrete levels of coordination constitute the leading factor 
in shaping sustainable relationships. Interviews confirmed the developing nature of such mechanisms, 
ranging from personal trust and “given word” to the coordination of efforts, information exchange and 
support by buyers. Further research on the nature of such agreements could prove to be particularly 
relevant from both a theoretical and practical perspective. On the theoretical level, investigating the 
direct and indirect effects of such agreements on sustainable relationships, and levels of uncertainty and 
trust,could provide insights into developing constructs that measure different facets of the informal 
contracts/agreements. From a practical standpoint, understanding the various levels of commitment that 
such agreements imply would be very helpful for buyers in the development of sustainable relationships.  
Our results indicate that an increase in the perceived level of competition between buyers constitutes a 
significant determinant of relational governance. This result is consistent with TCE main prepositions on 
opportunism as a constant feature of business relationships and the findings of Walker and Weber (1987) 
on the role of competition. The implications are particularly interesting for buyers who need to coordinate 
better with their supply base to avoid volume and market uncertainties in an increasingly environment. 
Further research using uncertainty as a moderator can shed some light on the role of competition under 
different levels of uncertainty.  
The research findings have both policy and managerial implications . On the policy level, the results 
support the notion that farmers who depend more on apple production are more inclined to establish 
more stable relationships with chain actors downstream. Therefore, it is  important that any government 
or donor programme that is intended to strengthen vertical coordination in the apple value chain 
consider, above all, those “specialised” farmers with dependence on orchard farming. In-depth interviews 
confirm that vertical chain organisation works better when actors downstream work with groups of 
farmers rather than with individual farmers. In this context, any government  intervention or donor agency 
intervention may consider establishing public-private partnerships – key value chain actors (local 
collectors, exporters) and farmers assisted in groups by public extension service s - with the objective of 
strengthening both vertical cooperation and cooperation amongst farmers. At the managerial level, it is 
expected that farmers’ opportunistic behaviour, induced by perceptions of high levels of competition 
downstream, should motivate businesses downstream – mainly local collectors and wholesalers – to 
establish stable relationships with farmers should they target new markets or markets with differentiated 
apple products. Meeting such market requirements can be very difficult unless stable relationships are 
established between such businesses and farmers. In this context, managers should consider very 
carefully the possibility of developing informal or formal agreements and extending their level of 
cooperation with farmers to ensure their commitment.  Public institutions and policies may also consider 
supporting “chain leaders” in their efforts to establish chain leadership. 
One factor that may contribute to high transaction costs is the lack of supply chain management practices. 
Adoption of supply chain management practices, such as product standardization, can contribute to 
reducing transaction costs between producers and buyers (Coronado et al., 2015). Thus, public support 
policies that support the improvement of supply chain management practices, and in particular standards 
would provide better market access and lower transaction costs for farmers. Such policies imply 
developing and supporting better coordination between buyers and farmers.  
This study has some limitations that imply caution in generalization of its findings. A first limitation 
concerns the development stage of value chain governance in Albania; some forms of  governance are just 
now emerging and are substituting the classical spot market. As sector development is likely to undergo 
dynamic change due to increased production and new market trends, some findings may only be 
temporary and subject to change in the short to medium term. A second limitation is related to 
conducting a study in a “calm period” when environmental uncertainty is very low. The authors could not 
prove or contradict the hypothesised influence of environmental uncertainty on farmers’ propensity to 
cooperate or isolate eventual effects on behaviour uncertainty. Hence, the consideration of periods with 
more pronounced market uncertainty due to expected saturation of the domestic market could constitute 
“good ground” for future studies. The failure to conduct a rigorous random sampling limits the 
generalisation of the study results for the orchard sector; sampling data show that the results are biased 
towards more commercial sectors.  
Despite its limitations, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of the relationship between 
farmers and their buyers, as well as the channels adopted by commercial actors in the apple sector and 
the determinants explaining the governance modes investigated. Our arguments and empirical results 
confirm some TCT propositions and in particular the important role of informal agreements in shaping 
exchange relationships embedded in social networks. Finally, we highlight the practical importance of our 
research for policy-making and the management decision making. Further analyses applying longitudinal 
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models could provide a deeper insight into the dynamics between sustainable relationships and their 
determinants over time. 
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